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“[D]eveloping countries must be able to reap the benefits of international 
trade.” - Anna Lindh, former Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 
Towards Stability in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo – The Dodd-Frank Act’s Strengths and 
Weaknesses 
 Rebecca N. Sells* 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
When people hear the Democratic Republic of the Congo (herein Congo 
or DRC), unsurprisingly images of the “heart of darkness,” poverty, and 
despair arise. The Congo has been in a state of conflict even before gaining 
independence. Although the international war involving rebel groups and 
various African militias, which killed millions starting in 1996, was thought 
to be the height of Congo’s despair, the eastern part of the country 
continues to suffer from ongoing conflicts with rebel leaders controlling the 
region and using violent tactics, such as rape, to maintain power. Fueling 
the war is the growing need for precious minerals located in the region. 
International response to the crisis has come in many forms, including 
traditional aid. Yet more recently, foreign nations, including the United 
States, have looked at how legislation can help stop the violence. 
Unfortunately, the proposed legislation often has unforeseen or unintended 
consequences that arguably do more harm than good. 
I will argue this is the case for the Dodd-Frank Act, Section 1502, which 
took effect in 2013.1 The main summary of the legislation is as follows: 
                                                                                                                     
* Rebecca Sells is a 2014 JD candidate at Seattle University School of Law. She received 
her BA in International Relations from University of California, Davis. Prior to law 
school, she spent a year in Africa working with a nonprofit agency and traveling through 
13 countries. She would like to extend a special thanks to the many people who have 
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[I]ssuers with conflict minerals that are necessary to the 
functionality or production of a product manufactured by such 
person to disclose annually whether any of those minerals 
originated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an 
adjoining country. If an issuer’s conflict minerals originated in 
those countries, Section 13(p) requires the issuer to submit a report 
to the Commission that includes a description of the measures it 
took to exercise due diligence on the conflict minerals’ source and 
chain of custody.2 
More simply, the Act requires US companies to report if their products 
contain “conflict minerals”3 obtained from the DRC or other neighboring 
countries.4 If the products do contain conflict minerals, the company must 
report what steps were taken to ensure that the minerals were not obtained 
via means that continue the conflict in the DRC. 5  There are no 
repercussions if a company uses conflict minerals—the hope is that the 
consumers will be diligent and avoid these products.6 
Although those behind the Dodd-Frank Act had good intentions, the 
actual implications of the legislation have been overwhelmingly negative.7 
Not only has the legislation been made extremely weak due to lobbyists and 
private interests, but it also has already had harmful effects on the 
                                                                                                                     
provided guidance and encouragement throughout this writing process, and especially 
thank the Seattle Journal for Social Justice for their hard work and assistance.  
1 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56274-01 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 240 and 249b). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Laura Seay, What’s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502? Conflict Minerals, Civilian 
Livelihoods, and the Unintended Consequences of Western Advocacy 13 (Center for 
Global Development, Working Paper No. 284, Jan. 2012), available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/files/1425843_file_Seay_Dodd_Frank_FINAL (arguing one 
plausible theory as Kabila’s intention to sway voters in the upcoming election). 
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Congolese people. 8  By examining the legislation, its impact, and its 
potential alternatives, this paper will aim to combine legal analysis with a 
comprehensive discussion on what is necessary to stabilize the region. 
While others have discussed which American laws should change to 
address the conflict, this article will argue that such reporting measures are 
too weak, do not address the root problems, and, therefore, are ineffective in 
curing the violence in the DRC. Instead, I will present a variety of 
considerations that the United States and other nations should explore in 
order to create a legitimate, stable system of mineral exports while 
addressing the root problems fueling the crisis. 
In order to present a comprehensive understanding of the factors 
contributing to the violence in the DRC, I will begin with a brief history of 
the region. Following this will be a discussion on the conflict minerals 
themselves, including what minerals are mined, what they are used for, and 
how they are extracted and exported to become part of a finished product. 
With the background material covered, I will then move on to what forms 
of aid have been given, what types of legislation have been enacted to 
address the issues within the DRC, and why they have or have not worked. 
This leads to a discussion of the Dodd-Frank Act, including how it 
originated and the changes it has gone through to gain the support necessary 
to enact the legislation. A critical lens will be used to examine the realistic 
consequences and benefits of the legislation in the DRC and discuss the 
weaknesses within the text that, much due to lobbyists, promise little 
liability for corporations absconding from the reporting process. Lastly, a 
prescriptive element will be offered, whereby I present a variety of 
considerations that must be explored in developing a plan to stabilize the 
region and end the violence that has killed so many. 
                                                                                                                     
8 Seay, supra note 7, at 15. 
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II.    HISTORY OF THE DRC 
Recorded history of the territory making up the DRC spans back 
thousands of years, but for purposes of this paper only the history from 
colonization forward will be discussed. The first recorded discovery of the 
DRC by Europeans was in 1482 when a Portuguese explorer, Diogo Cao, 
discovered the region and made relations with a local king.9 Through the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Congolese welcomed the European 
missionaries and traders.10 
In the mid-1800s, Belgium’s King Leopold II went about planning how 
he could gain control of the region and plunder its resources for his personal 
wealth.11 Leopold obtained more than 400 signed treatises with Congolese 
leaders and was able to have the DRC allocated to him during the 1884 
Berlin Conference, which carved the continent into pieces for the European 
nations. 12  Leopold subsequently established the Congo Free State and 
named himself as Head of State. 13  Over the next quarter of a century, 
Leopold used brutal tactics to obtain resources and export them to Europe. 
It is estimated that 13 million Congolese were killed or worked to their 
death under Leopold’s reign, while millions of others suffered physical 
deformities due to the tactics used to control the people and obtain 
resources.14 
                                                                                                                     
9 SCOTT F. BOBB, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE 
CONGO (Zaire) 2 (Scarecrow Press 1999). 
10 Id. at 3. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. For more information on the Berlin Conference see GEORGE MARTELLI, LEOPOLD 
TO LUMUMBA: A HISTORY OF THE BELGIAN CONGO 1877-1960, 97–107 (1962). 
13 BOBB, supra note 9, at 4. 
14 Michela Wrong, Belgium Confronts Its Heart of Darkness, THE INDEPENDENT (Feb. 
23, 2005), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/belgium-confronts-its-
heart-of-darkness-6151923.html. Examples of the brutality include the chopping off of 
hands if the rubber quota was not met. With the constant plundering of the land, the 
resources sought became scarcer and Leopold’s tactics became more brutal. See ADAM 
HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN 
COLONIAL AFRICA (1999). 
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Although many of the atrocities were shielded from Europeans, reports of 
the conditions did escape in the early part of the new century and resulted in 
Belgium taking control over the Congo in 1908, therein forming the 
Belgium Congo. 15  In 1959, riots erupted in the Congo amidst Africa’s 
uprising against colonial control.16 Belgium held on until June 30, 1960, 
when it handed over control to the Congolese.17 
Patrice Lumumba became the first prime minister of the newly formed 
state but was assassinated in 1961.18 Power struggles for the prime minister 
position occurred until 1965 when Joseph Mobutu seized power.19 Mobutu 
would rule for a long time with little success—he named the country Zaire 
and attempted to bring in foreign investments that ultimately failed.20 
The DRC made international headlines during the Rwandan Genocide in 
1994 when the Tutsi ethnic minority sought refuge across the DRC border.21 
After several years, most of the Tutsis returned back to Rwanda, while 
approximately 100,000 stayed in the DRC and aligned with DRC Tutsis.22 
Unhappy with Mobutu’s rule, the Tutsis gained support from neighboring 
countries and advanced on Kinshasa, the capital city.23 Through a series of 
political maneuvers Mobutu was ridded of his power in 1997 and was 
                                                                                                                     
15 BOBB, supra note 9, at 4. 
16 Id. at 5. 
17 Id. at 6. 
18 Id. at 6–7. The assassination is believed to have been supported by both the United 
States and Belgium. Lumumba, in trying to stabilize the region, sought help from outside 
countries, and when he was refused help by the United States, he contacted the Soviet 
Union. In the height of the Cold War, the United States feared the country would align 
with the Soviets, therein justifying the assassination. Georges Nzongola Ntalaja, Partice 
Lumumba: The Most Important Assassination of the 20th Century, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 
17, 2011, 5:39 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/201 
1/jan/17/patrice-lumumba-50th-anniversary-assassination. 
19 BOBB, supra note 9, at 8. 
20 Id. at 8–13. 
21 Id. at 17. 
22 Id. at 18. 
23 Id. at 17–18. 
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replaced with Laurent Kabila, who subsequently renamed Zaire the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.24 
Although reports of violence and mass murders by the Tutsis occurred 
prior to Kabila’s reign, violence continued to expand after Kabila was 
accused of corruption for appointing his staff as members of the 
government.25 Anti-Kabila rebel groups were formed, supported by Rwanda, 
Uganda, and Burundi.26 Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia sent troops to 
counter the rebels and support Kabila.27 War broke out. In 1999 it was 
reported that 20 armed rebel groups were active in the DRC with an 
estimated 5.4 million Congolese dying between 1998 and 2008 as a result of 
the war.28 
In 2001, while the war was raging, a bodyguard assassinated Kabila.29 
Kabila’s son, Joseph Kabila, subsequently took power.30 Shortly thereafter, 
the young Kabila attempted to broker a peace agreement, obtaining 
promises from both the Rwandan and Ugandan governments stating that 
they would withdraw their troops from the DRC. 31  Unfortunately, the 
                                                                                                                     
24 Id. at 18. 
25 Id. at 19–20. 
26 Id. at 20. 
27 Id. 
28 This is a highly disputed figure. The International Rescue Committee published its 
number of 5.4 million dying from “war-related causes.” Special Report: Congo, 
INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE http://www.rescue.org/special-reports/special-
report-congo-y. But other agencies have criticized this number, saying that many of the 
deaths would have occurred without the war due to common illness and disease. See DR 
Congo War Deaths ‘Exaggerated’, BBC (Jan. 20, 2010, 6:51 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8471147.stm. 
29 MICHAEL NEST, FRANCOIS GRINGNON & EMIZET KISANGANI, THE DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO: ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF WAR AND PEACE 27 (2005). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. Although they did go about pulling back troops, both Uganda and Rwanda were 
found via the UN to delay their withdrawal in an attempt to obtain minerals. Id. 
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prospect of peace did not last long—by 2004 Rwandan rebels were 
wreaking havoc in the East.32 
To this day, many rebel groups continue to control parts of the DRC.33 
Although UN Peacekeepers and other aid groups have been in the DRC for 
many years attempting to calm the situation and provide support for 
innocent civilians, the violence continues to take its toll.34 It is estimated 
that 45,000 Congolese die every month, mostly from lack of food, 
preventable illness, and other consequences of war. 35  Many of the 
Congolese who are not killed by the conflict are subjected to heinous crimes, 
                                                                                                                     
32 See Back to the Brink in the Congo, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (Dec. 17, 2004), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/B021-back-to-the-
brink-in-the-congo.aspx. 
33 Jeffery Gettleman, Congo Slips into Chaos Again as Rebels Gain, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/world/africa/as-rebels-gain-congo-again-
slips-into-chaos.html?_r=0. In November 2012, the eastern city of Goma was taken by 
rebels. Goma is the epicenter for the aid industry in the east. I visited Goma in July 2010, 
and was amazed to see the expansive aid network, complete with lavish housing 
developments for aid workers and upscale restaurants. Id. It is not only rebel groups that 
control the trade and cause violence in the DRC. The Congolese army is corrupt and 
often perpetrates crimes. The problem has been made worse by the integration of rebel 
groups into the army. Because of the serious violations, the UN had to sever their 
relationship with the army. This problem raises the complex issue of how to ensure 
civilian safety and secure the supply chain if those hired to protect the system are actually 
endangering it. Congo Jeffery Gettlemen, Army Helps Rebels Get Arms, U.N. Finds N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/25/world/africa/25congo.html?_ 
r=0. 
34 Why international aid has been unable to end the violence in the DRC is a complex 
topic, worthy of its own article. Several of the biggest factors include the type of war 
being fought by the rebel groups, including the use of “bush” tactics whereby they move 
around the region terrorizing civilians and destroying infrastructure as they go. Much of 
the aid industry is focused on providing basic necessities to civilians, including food and 
healthcare and is not looking at the long-term stability of the region. For an in-depth 
discussion on ways in which international support fails to successfully aid Africa, see 
DAMBISA MOYO, DEAD AID: WHY AID IS NOT WORKING AND HOW THERE IS A BETTER 
WAY (2010). It should be acknowledged here that I in no way intend to discredit those 
agencies providing short-term aid to the region; I simply want to acknowledge that there 
is a difference between aid agencies aimed at providing short-term relief, and those 
focusing on long-term stability. 
35 Roots of the Crisis - Congo, ENOUGH,http://www.enoughproject.org/conflict_areas 
/eastern_congo/roots-crisis (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
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including rape and other forms of sexual assault.36  Rebel groups, some 
backed by neighboring countries, show no intent of ending the conflict. 37 
While financial gain from the precious minerals is one reason for the 
violence, many argue the mineral trade is a symptom of the crisis and not a 
cause.38 This argument is based on the fact that not all mines are points of 
controversy; many mines are operated peacefully.39 That the mineral trade 
is not the sole cause of the violence raises the point that even if the trade 
can be made secure and stable, it will not stop the violence within the DRC. 
Therefore, other issues causing the violence must be addressed in creating 
an effective response. 
The issue of land rights is also a reason for the violence and is a common 
problem within Africa as a whole. Land is disputed because “customary, 
informal and statutory land-tenure systems ‘overlap’ geographically, in the 
sense that a certain parcel of land might be claimed by different actors 
under different systems.”40 The land disputes are fought fervently because, 
                                                                                                                     
36 Jeffery Gettleman, Congo Study Suggest a Higher Rate of Rape in Congo, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 11, 2011),http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/12/world/africa/12congo.html. The 
Eastern part of the DRC is thought to have the highest rate of rape in the world. Id.  
Estimates put the number of rapes at 2 million, with a rape said to occur every minute. Id. 
Rape is used as a weapon of war to instill fear and gain control of civilians by rebels. Id.   
Many of the crimes against civilians are perpetrated by the Congolese army, who, while 
under the control of the government, are notorious for unethical and violent behavior, 
corruption, and a failure to follow orders. Id. 
37 The past five years in the DRC have been marked by complex power struggles and 
attempts at peace negotiations with intervening foreign aid groups. See Democratic 
Republic of Congo, BBC, (Feb 5, 2013, 12:48 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
africa-13286306. 
38 George Fominyen, Mineral Certification: The Path to End Congo’s Violence?, 
ALERTNET (May 6, 2011 6:56 PM), http://m.trust.org/alertnet/news/mineral-certification-
the-path-to-end-congos-violence/. 
39 Id. 
40 Chris Huggins, Land, Power and Identity, Roots of Violent Conflict in DRC, 5 (INT’L 
ALERT, Nov. 2010) available at http://www.internationalalert.org/sites/default/files/pub 
lications/201011LandPowerIdentity.pdf. 
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while land is essential for livelihood, “it is also bound up very strongly with 
issues of ‘identity and power.’”41 
Ethnic tension is another reason for the violence.42 While ethnic tension 
existed in the DRC prior to the Rwandan genocide, tension rose when 
Ugandans and Rwandans entered the DRC following the genocide.43 The 
ethnic tension is tied to economic status and political power and is 
complicated by the sheer multitude of ethnic groups in the region.44 While a 
full discussion on ethnic tension is unnecessary for this paper, it should be 
noted that rebel groups generally do not have members from multiple ethnic 
groups.45 
Two other corresponding causes of the violence that must be noted are 
the lack of legitimate economic opportunity and government. Without 
economic opportunities to provide income, many Congolese are pushed 
towards the violence as a means to provide for themselves and their families. 
Without a functioning government to enforce laws, there are no 
repercussions for their actions. 
While many of the general causes of the violence are due to the 
complexity of the situation, the specific reasons for the violence, such as 
what land is fought over by what groups, are largely unknown. The impact 
of not understanding the “full picture” of the situation will be discussed 
throughout this paper. 
                                                                                                                     
41 Id. 
42 Background: The Congo Conflict, PEACEBUILDINGDATA.ORG, http://www.peacebuild 
ingdata.org/drc/congo-conflict (last visited Oct. 11, 2013). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
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Source: A Map of the DRC, The World Factbook46 
   
 
 
                                                                                                                     
46 CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE, THE WORLD FACTBOOK,  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2013) (Exhibit A: Map of the DRC. Note that Kinshasa lies on the western part of 
the country, while the present day conflict is mainly in the east on the Rwandan and 
Ugandan border, around the city of Goma). 
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III.   MINERALS: A FACTOR BEHIND THE VIOLENCE 
The DRC is extremely rich in natural resources. Besides timber and 
rubber, the DRC contains, among others, diamonds, gold, tin, tungsten, and 
tantalum (herein coltan).47 The following table displays estimates of gold, 
tin, tungsten, and coltan located in the DRC. 
 
 Amount 
estimated to be 
produced in 
DRC annually 
Percentof world 
production 
within DRC 
Common Uses 
Tin 24,000 metric 
tons. 
6-8% Solders, tin 
plates, chemicals. 
Tungsten 1,300 metric 
tons. 
2-4% Tools, alloy, 
tungsten steel. 
Coltan 155 metric 
tons. 
15-20% Capacitors for 
cell phones, 
automobiles, 
computers, and 
other electronics. 
Gold 6.5 tons. Unknown Jewelry, coins, 
electronics. 
Source: The Business of a Better World48 
 
Although the four minerals listed in the chart are the focus of the Dodd-
Frank Act, the most fascinating mineral is coltan, a mineral unknown to 
many. Coltan is essential for electronics and is used in capacitors, which are 
                                                                                                                     
47 Because the Dodd-Frank Act only includes tin, tungsten, coltan and gold, the many 
other resources found in the DRC will not be discussed.  
48 BSR, Conflict Minerals and the Democratic Republic of the Congo – Responsible 
Actions in Supply Chains, Government Engagement and Capacity Building (May 2010), 
available at http://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR_Conflict_Minerals_and_the_DRC.pdf. 
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needed for nearly every electronic item. Put simply, cell phones and other 
electronics would not be able to function without coltan. 
Unsurprisingly, the development of the cell phone industry and other 
electronics has increased the demand for coltan. Coltan garnered 
international attention in the early 2000s during the rapid increase in 
consumption of electronics; coltan prices went up ten-folds in fear of a 
shortage of the precious mineral.49 The price increase fueled a global fear 
that electronics would increase in price or become unavailable.50 Although 
the price of coltan decreased, spikes continue to occur.51 
The process by which coltan, gold, tungsten, and tin are extracted is a 
complex byproduct of the continuing conflict and disarray. While some of 
the minerals are extracted from large mines, many are initially extracted by 
artisanal miners—miners who do not use or use minimal, mechanical tools 
and extract minerals on a small scale.52 Once extracted, the minerals are 
transferred between sales agents, trading houses, exporters, and traders.53 
                                                                                                                     
49 Blaine Harden, A Dirt in the New Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/12/magazine/the-dirt-in-the-new machine.Html?page 
wanted=all&src=pm. 
50 Id. 
51 Jeffery W. Mantz, Improvisational Economies: Coltan Production in the Eastern 
Congo, Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale (2008) at 34–50, available at 
http://mason.gmu.edu/~jmantz/Improvisational%20Economies.pdf. For a chart on price 
fluctuations from 2007-2010, see Lisa Reisman, Tantalum Prices About to Go Through 
The Roof?, METALMINER (Jan. 20, 2011), available at http://agmetalminer.com/2011 
/01/20/tantalum-prices-about-through-the-roof/. 
52 BSR, supra note 48, at 5. Thirteen large mines and over 200 small mines have been 
documented in the DRC. The Congolese government does not recognize the legitimacy 
of most of these artisanal mines, and, therefore, the process is carried out illegally. This 
subjects the miners to exploitation by rebel groups because the miners cannot seek 
government support or protection. Id. The extraction of the minerals is a dangerous 
process. With no safety restrictions, many miners are injured or killed. The 
environmental impact of mining should also be mentioned. Unlike regulated mines with 
environmental restrictions, the artisanal miners are not subject to such, and therein are 
able to proceed in whatever manner they see fit, with no consideration of the long or 
short term impact to the environment. These impacts include deforestation and water 
pollution. Id. at 9–10. 
53 See id. at 13. 
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Before leaving the DRC, the minerals may have exchanged hands more 
than a dozen times and been mixed with minerals from other mines.54 With 
so many exchanges, it is unsurprising that upon exportation most minerals 
are of an unknown origin, leaving the buyer completely unaware of the 
specific mine from which the minerals were extracted.55 
Although the minerals are normally exported to Asia–where they are 
processed into goods to be sold worldwide–it is important to discuss East 
Africa’s role in the trade. Countries like Rwanda and Uganda have little to 
no natural stock of the minerals discussed but still derive a substantial profit 
from the exportation of these minerals.56 The profit is a result of illegal 
exportation of the minerals. For example, Uganda, which shares a border 
with the DRC, is said to traffic gold from the DRC and export millions of 
dollars worth of it to the United Arab Emirates and other countries. 57 
Unsurprisingly, because of the large financial gain at stake, many of these 
East African countries are financially supporting the rebel groups within the 
DRC.58 
                                                                                                                     
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Daniel R. Donovan, Mineral Smuggling in Central Africa: The Case of Rwanda, 
Uganda, and Perpetual Violence in the DRC, CAI – CONSULTANCY AFRICA 
INTELLIGENCE (Feb. 18, 2013, 6:20 AM), http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php 
?option=com_content&view=article&id=1222:mineral-smuggling-in-central-africa-the-
case-of-rwanda-uganda-and-perpetual-violence-in-the-drc-&catid=57:africa-watch-
discussion-papers&Itemid=263. 
57 BSR, supra note 48, at 8. 
58 Id. at 8. For example, Tanzania is believed to support an arms dealer that aids one of 
the rebel groups in the DRC. Donovan, supra note 63. Likewise, both Uganda and 
Rwanda have been documented as providing financial, along with military support, in the 
region. But see Comments of William M. Ngeleja, Minister of Energy and Minerals, 
United Republic of Tanzania, Release No. 34-63547; File No. S7-40-10 (May 23, 2011) 
(claiming, “Tanzania has, at no point, sought to pursue any strategic or self-interested 
objectives in the DRC. Furthermore, the United Republic of Tanzania has consequently 
managed to avoid direct involvement in the conflict around DRC”). 
616 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
A. Rebel Control of the Mineral Trade and Congolese Civilians  
With such a complex process of exportation and lack of stability in the 
DRC, rebel groups are able to obtain tremendous financial wealth from the 
trade, thus allowing them to fund their violent tactics.59 There are two main 
methods for which the rebel groups are able to obtain profits from the 
minerals.60 The first is by controlling the mines directly and renting the 
space out to the miners, who in turn pay the rebels with money or 
minerals.61 The second is where the rebels do not control the mines but 
impose an illegal tax on the minerals during the exportation process.62 
Pierre Englebert explains a detailed account of rebel control over mining: 
[A]ctors, like rebel groups or chieftaincies, may also be able to tax 
people, but they cannot do so legally and must resort to force or 
popular legitimacy in order to manage levies on the income and 
assets of people in the regions they control . . . . The Congolese 
rebel organization RCD, for example, raised its own taxes in the 
areas it controlled between 1998 and 2003, in addition to servicing 
established Congolese taxes. It also set up its own monopsony for 
the purchase of [coltan] . . . , which alone was allowed to market 
coltan from diggers, in exchange for a monthly tax of $1 
million . . . . Yet, many of these rebel taxes remain predicated on 
physical control or on claims to sovereignty by the rebels. In 
general, they take place at specific physical locations, like ports of 
entry, where control can be more easily exercised . . . . In addition, 
rebels make great use of the local remnants of sovereign state 
institutions in their strategies of extraction. The RCD, for example, 
mainly collected taxes through existing regional state agencies, 
free-riding on their enduring sovereign nature.63 
 
                                                                                                                     
59 See BSR, supra note 48, at 5 (estimating that between 75 percent and 95 percent of 
financing came from taxation of minerals). 
60 Id. at 5. 
61 Id. A recent report found that 12 of the major mines and over half of the 200 artisanal 
mines were controlled directly by rebel groups. Id. 
62 Id. 
63 PIERRE ENGLEBERT, AFRICA: UNITY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SORROW 73–74 (2009). 
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It is estimated that in 2008 alone, the rebel groups obtained over $185 
million because of the mineral trade, thereby allowing them to purchase 
more weapons and continue the violence.64 
Although the mining and exportation process has caused continued 
violence in the region, many Congolese rely economically on the mineral 
trade. At least one million people rely on the mineral trade as a source of 
revenue, while the World Bank estimates, “10 million Congolese (16 
percent of the population) in total are in some way dependant [sic] on the 
artisanal mining industry in the country.”65 As will be seen further in this 
article, any legislation that impacts the mining sector has and will continue 
to substantially impact the Congolese civilians. 
IV.    LEGISLATION IN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
A. The DRC’s Approach 
In an effort to stabilize the region and legitimize the mineral trade, the 
Congolese government has made numerous attempts to create legislation. 
For example, “the DRC’s Mining Law of 2002 require[d] community 
consultations, disclosure of contract terms by both companies and the 
government, and revenue transparency through adherence to EITI 
guidelines.”66 
But while attempts have been made by the Congolese government to 
stabilize the region and legitimize the trade, there are various reasons why 
they have not succeeded. Lack of transparency and corruption are two of the 
key problems that have hindered the process. The DRC ranked 160 out of 
                                                                                                                     
64 A Comprehensive Approach to Congo’s Conflict Minerals – Strategy Paper, ENOUGH 
PROJECT (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/comprehensive-
approach-conflict-minerals-strategy-paper. 
65 BSR, supra note 48, at 5. 
66 Clementine Burnley, Natural Resources Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo: A Question of Governance?, 12 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 7, 10 (2011). 
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178 in the 2012 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index.67 
Many politicians act in their own interest, while government agents have 
been known to illegally tax the mining operations in the DRC and justify 
those acts based on a lack of government-supplied income.68 
  Another reason the government has failed to stabilize the trade via 
legislation is that the government has not protected the trade routes 
themselves.69 Even if transparency initiatives were effective and revenue 
was documented, there is no guarantee that purchasers would stop obtaining 
minerals from rebel groups controlling the supply chain.70 Regardless of 
what peace initiatives are put into place, if the trade routes continue to be 
used in the same manner they presently are, purchasers will continue to 
finance the rebel groups. 
In September 2010, the Congolese government implemented a mining 
ban in the rebel territory.71 Given that the ban was implemented when the 
Dodd-Frank Act was being finalized, it is uniformly believed to have been a 
response to the Act.72 Many gave credit to Kabila, arguing it was a good 
sign that the government was willing to take financial losses in order to 
stabilize the region.73 
Although the 2010 ban was hailed by many as a positive step, it raises 
important considerations about the impact of legislation.74 When Kabila and 
                                                                                                                     
67 Corruption Perception Indexes 2012, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2013). 
68 See Clementine Burnley, Natural Resources Conflict in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo: A Question of Governance?, 12 SUSTAINABLE DEV. LAW & POL’Y 7, 8 
(2011). 
69 BSR, supra note 48, at 13. 
70 Seay, supra note 7, at 15. 
71 DR Congo Bans Mining in Eastern Provinces, BBC (Sep. 11, 2010), available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11269360. 
72 See Seay, supra note 7, at 15. 
73 E.g. Anne DeVoe, Carrying a Piece of Congo in Our Pockets: Global Complicity to 
Congo’s Sexual Violence and the Conflict Minerals Trade, 10 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 
463, 465 (hailing “President Kabila’s temporary ban [as] a positive step towards policy 
reform on conflict minerals”). 
74 E.g., id. 
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his military were enforcing the mining ban, it was the Congolese civilians 
who suffered the most. It is estimated that during the ban one to two million 
artisanal miners were out of work.75 As Professor Laura Seay points out, 
when one considers that each of these miners has roughly five to six 
dependents, the Act “inadvertently and directly negatively affected up to 
five to twelve million Congolese civilians.”76 The loss of income increased 
rates of hunger, disease, and death.77 
At the same time, the ban failed to achieve the goal of decreasing the 
control of the trade by rebel groups because nothing was done to remove the 
rebels. Instead, the groups stayed in place or advanced their efforts by 
expanding their smuggling routes and diversifying their exports.78 The ban 
lasted until March 2011.79 
Two schools of thought exist regarding mining bans. The first has a 
negative view towards them, believing that, whether done by the Congolese 
government or outside states exporting the minerals, banning conflict 
minerals will not work.80 It is argued that imposing a blanket ban will cause 
the civilian populations dependent on the mineral trade to suffer but will not 
impact the rebel groups substantially because, instead of exporting the 
minerals through the banned territories, the groups will make efforts to 
export the minerals through other areas of the DRC or neighboring 
countries.81 This occurred during the 2010 ban.82 
Even if only minerals obtained via conflict are banned, issues still arise 
because it is nearly impossible to trace a product that has changed hands so 
                                                                                                                     
75 Seay, supra note 7, at 15. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 16. 
79 See The Associated Press, Congo: Government Lifts Mining Ban Amid Criticism, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/world/africa 
/11briefs-Congo.html?_r=0. 
80 BSR, supra note 48, at 12. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 16. 
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many times. The problem is complicated by the fact that the mines are not 
regulated, and so the traceability essentially fails from the start. 
Those in favor of a mining ban acknowledge that it is difficult to 
differentiate between legitimate minerals and those mined illegally and, 
therefore, argue that a blanket ban should be put in place until the region is 
stabilized.83 Supporters argue that a “temporary, carefully-implemented ban” 
could work if “coupled with large-scale regional assistance and probably 
managed through international institutions” as “part of a solution” with “the 
ultimate goal [being] to develop effective, verifiably conflict-free sourcing 
from the region, in collaboration with industry, NGO and other efforts.”84 
Although this sounds like a simple solution, it would not only be ineffective 
for the reasons listed above, but it would also be very damaging to the well-
being of the Congolese. The “regional assistance” proposed by the 
supporters would be nearly impossible to provide given that millions of 
people rely on the trade, and many of those people live in remote regions. 
B. Other International Policies Attempted 
Regional programs have been developed to stabilize the situation in the 
DRC. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(“OECD”) designed auditing guidelines for mineral processors. 85  The 
International Conference of the Great Lakes “committed to a regional 
certification mechanism, which provides a clear procedure and adequate 
records of mineral origins.” 86  The International Tin Research Initiative 
                                                                                                                     
83 Id. at 12. 
84 See id. But at the same time it is argued that a “temporary, carefully-implemented ban” 
could work if “coupled with large-scale regional assistance and probably managed 
through international institutions” as “part of a solution” with “the ultimate goal [being] 
to develop effective, verifiably conflict-free sourcing from the region, in collaboration 
with industry, NGO and other efforts.” Id. 
85 Burnley, supra note 68, at 10. 
86 Id. It is questionable whether neighboring countries’ efforts are made in good faith. Id. 
Neighboring countries have a strong incentive not to stabilize the region due to the 
substantial profits that many of them make from the mineral trade. Id. Stabilization would 
Towards Stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo  621 
VOLUME 12 • ISSUE 2 • 2013 
worked to increase “due diligence, traceability, and certification processes 
for tin through the Tin Supply Chain Initiative.”87 Unsurprisingly, each of 
these programs has battled over issues “relating to cost, implementation, 
monitoring, human capacity, and resource gaps.”88 
Outside of Africa, efforts have been made to create traceability 
regulations and schemes. One such scheme is PROMINES, a collaborative 
effort between the DRC government, the World Bank, and industry 
members that aims to regulate and strengthen the mining sector.89 While 
PROMINES is a different approach designed by those involved in the 
mineral trade, it has been “largely ignored and/or confused with the mess 
surrounding” the Dodd-Frank Act.90 
V. US RESPONSE TO CONFLICT MINERALS – THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
Over the past decade, global awareness regarding the use of minerals that 
finance the Congolese violence has increased substantially. This is in part 
due to the accessibility of information via the Internet, but the efforts of 
nonprofit groups and reporters have had a substantial impact as well.91 
There has been a push to decrease or abolish the use of conflict minerals 
in American products because of the growing concern over the conflict in 
                                                                                                                     
decrease these governments’ incomes and the personal profits politicians obtain from the 
trade. See BSR, supra note 48, at 8. 
87 Burnley, supra note 68, at 10. 
88 Id. See also Seay, supra note 7, at 20. 
89 Seay, supra note 7, at 20. 
90 Id. A long discussion of other international responses to the crisis, including those by 
individual corporations, countries, and international organizations, could be included here. 
Due to the focus of this paper, however, the discussion will skip this and instead focus 
solely on US efforts. 
91 Examples of groups seeking to raise awareness regarding the conflict include The 
Enough Project, which is headed by John Prendergast, former advisor to Condoleezza 
Rice and award-winning activist. This group aims to raise awareness and seek sustainable 
change in the DRC. See, e.g., Enough Project, http://www.enoughproject.org/ (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2013). Likewise, news agencies, particularly those such as BBC and the New 
York Times, have critically discussed the issue in various articles. 
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the region.92 One of the initiatives, House Bill 4128, sought to prevent 
“articles made wholly or in part with components containing conflict 
minerals from facilities that have not been audited in accordance with [the 
legislation]” from being imported. 93  The Bill would have subjected 
companies to audits and required that all products be marked with the 
contained mineral’s country of origin. 94  This drastic blanket approach 
ultimately failed.95 
A. What the Dodd-Frank Act Entails 
The latest attempt to stabilize the region is the Dodd-Frank Consumer 
Protection Act, signed into law by President Barack Obama on July 21, 
2010.96 The Act was designed to address many of the economic pitfalls that 
led to the recent financial crisis.97 But buried within the Act is Section 1502, 
which is allegedly aimed at securing peace and stability within the DRC.98 
The opening text of the section states the following: 
It is the sense of Congress that the exploitation and trade of 
conflict minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo is helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme 
levels of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
particularly sexual- and gender-based violence, and contributing to 
                                                                                                                     
92 Conflict Minerals Trade Act, H.R. 4128, 111th Cong. (2009). As will be discussed 
below, many corporations have sought to oppose the abolition of conflict minerals 
because it would mean that there would be higher input costs from products obtained 
elsewhere for legitimate prices. Id. 
93 Id at § 7(b). 
94 Id at § 6(c)(2)(B)(v). 
95 For reasons discussed previously, a blanket ban would not likely have been effective 
in reducing the violence in the region and would have made it difficult to trace where the 
minerals originated and if they were truly conflict free. 
96 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th 
Cong. (2010). 
97 Id. 
98 Id at § 1502. 
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an emergency humanitarian situation therein, warranting [the 
subsequent provisions].99 
The subsequent provisions describe what is to be enforced. The main 
thrust of the text is that any companies using conflict minerals—which for 
purposes of this legislation are tin, tungsten, coltan, and gold—in their 
products are required to report whether the minerals originated from the 
DRC or “adjoining countries” if the conflict minerals are “necessary to the 
functionality or production of the product.”100 Products that are “conflict 
free” are described as “not contain[ing] conflict minerals that directly or 
indirectly finance or benefit armed groups in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo or an adjoining country” and are not subject to the legislation.101 
But if the minerals within the product did originate in one of the specified 
countries, the company must report to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) what efforts were made “to exercise due diligence on 
the source and chain of custody of such minerals.”102 
The report must include “[t]he measures taken to exercise due 
diligence[,] . . . includ[ing] an independent private sector audit of the report 
that is conducted in accordance with standards established by the 
Comptroller General of the United States.” 103  Each report requires a 
description of the products manufactured or contracted to be manufactured 
that are not “DRC conflict free,” the facilities used to process the conflict 
minerals, the country of origin of the conflict minerals, and the efforts to 
                                                                                                                     
99 Id at § 1502(a). 
100 Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 293. Issuers must comply with the final rule for 
the calendar year beginning January 1, 2013, with the first reports due May 31, 2014. 
Conflict Minerals, supra note 1. “Adjoining countries” only includes those sharing a 
geographical border with the DRC. Therefore, countries such as Kenya and Tanzania 
who export the minerals do not require labeling.  
101 Id. at 56, 322. 
102 Id. at 56, 329. 
103 Id. at 56, 274. 
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determine the mine or location of origin.104 After formulating a report the 
issuer must make it “available to the public on its Internet Web site.”105 
Essentially, Section 1502 requires a process of self-reporting whereby 
those companies providing products containing “conflict minerals” are 
required to submit a report if it is believed that any of the minerals 
originated in the DRC or neighboring countries. The report, which is subject 
to a private audit, must discuss what efforts were made to ensure that the 
minerals did not contribute to the ongoing conflict and were legitimately 
mined and exported. Upon disclosing that the products contain conflict 
minerals from the DRC or surrounding region, the company must then 
make such information available to the public via their company website. 
The flowchart in Appendix A shows the process with which companies are 
to proceed.106 
VI.   WEAKENING OF THE LEGISLATION DUE TO CORPORATE 
LOBBYISTS AND OTHER INFLUENCES 
Although American legislation aimed at improving the conditions within 
Africa is undoubtedly a positive step towards the acknowledgement of an 
interdependent economic world and the impact the United States has on the 
Congolese crisis, the actual text of the legislation, the changes made during 
the legislative process, and the legislation’s ultimate impact (both thus far 
and in the future) must be critically analyzed. The first piece of this section 
will look at changes made to the legislation during its creation and the 
significant loopholes because of these changes. Next, the broader problems 
with the Act will be explored. Finally, the Act’s impact in the DRC will be 
examined. 
                                                                                                                     
104 Id. at 56, 275. 
105 Id. at 56, 274. 
106 Id. at 56, 283. 
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A. The Exclusion of Mining Issuers Reduces the Effectiveness of the Act and 
Places an Additional Burden on Reporting Companies 
In the original draft of the legislation, mining issuers107 were considered 
to be manufacturers and were thus subject to the reporting rules.108 This 
requirement has now been changed so that mining issuers need not report 
unless they “also engage in manufacturing.”109 
Lobbying by the National Mining Association (herein the “Association”) 
was likely a substantial reason for the exclusion.110 The Association argues 
that issuers are not perpetuating the violence in the DRC because they have 
“secure supply chains.”111 The Association also argued that Congress has 
not intended to include issuers as manufacturers based on a plain reading of 
the statute, previous versions of the applicable section, and legislative 
statements.112  
In excluding issuers, the Commission referred to the prior versions of the 
Conflict Mineral Statutory Provisions, which defined issuers to be anyone 
engaged in “the commercial exploration, extraction, importation, 
exportation or sale of the covered minerals.”113 The Commission reasoned 
                                                                                                                     
107 A mining issuer is one that “engages in the commercial development” of minerals. 
Development includes the “exploration, extraction, processing, export, and other 
significant actions relating to oil, natural gas, or minerals, or the acquisition of a license 
for any such activity.” Conflict Minerals, Securities Act Release No. 34-63547 (Dec. 23, 
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/34-63547.pdf. 
108 Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 292. 
109 Id. at 56, 280. 
110 Comments of National Mining Association to Securities Act Release No. 34-63547, 
(Dec. 23, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-393.pdf. 
(“Indeed, publicly-traded mining issuers, with their largely integrated and secure supply 
chains, were never identified in the legislative process as a cause or contributor to the 
problem of armed conflict in the DRC region…”). 
111 Id. 
112 See Comment of Srinivasan Venkatakrishnan, CFO, AngloGold Ashanti Limited, 
Johannesburg, South Africa at 8, to Securities Act Release No. 34-63547 (Dec. 23, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-52.pdf. 
113 Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 293 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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that because the language had been removed, it was an intentional 
substantive change to the legislation.114 
Those in favor of including issuers argue that a potential pitfall of the 
exclusion is that other companies relying on issuers’ information regarding 
the status of the minerals now cannot do so, thus making it harder for 
companies to adhere to the Act and identify whether their minerals are 
conflict free. 115  Similar to this is the argument that, from a practical 
standpoint, it would make more sense to address the issue from the point of 
origin before the minerals are exported abroad. By excluding mining issuers, 
the Commission reduced the burden on the mining issuers but heightened 
the burden on the other companies required to report under the Act. The 
task of determining whether the minerals are conflict free would have been 
easier if they were labeled at the start when they were extracted. 
B. The Exclusion of Minerals from Scrap and Recycled Sources Creates 
Line Drawing Problems and Creates an Opportunity for Products to be 
Mislabeled 
In the proposed text of the legislation, the Act included minerals from 
recycled and scrap sources.116 As the text stood: 
[A]n issuer with conflict minerals that originated from recycled or 
scrap sources would have been required to disclose in its annual 
report, under the “Conflict Minerals Disclosure” heading, that its 
conflict minerals were obtained from recycled or scrap sources and 
that it furnished a Conflict Minerals Report regarding those 
recycled or scrap minerals. Also, under the proposed rules, an 
issuer would have been required to state that its products 
                                                                                                                     
114 Id. at 56, 293. 
115 Id. at 56, 292. See also Comments of Corinna Gilfillan, Head of US Office for Global 
Witness, Washington, District of Columbia to Securities Act Release No. 34-63547 (Dec. 
23, 2010), at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-508.pdf; Comments of 
John Sharp, TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., Hillsboro, Oregon at 1-2, to Securities Act 
Release No. 34-63547 (Dec. 23, 2010), at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-
10/s74010-194.pdf. 
116 Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 329. 
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containing or produced with recycled or scrap minerals in the 
Conflict Minerals Report were considered “DRC conflict free.” In 
addition, such an issuer would have described the measures taken 
to exercise due diligence in determining that its conflict minerals 
were recycled or scrap and obtain an independent private sector 
audit of that report.117 
Several concerns resulted from the proposed reporting of recycled goods. 
First was the fear that the requirement would detour companies from using 
recycled sources, therein decreasing the reuse of products and increasing the 
amount of usable products in landfills.118 Second was the concern regarding 
the difficulty in tracing where the minerals had originally been obtained.119 
The National Mining Association emphasized that “the focus of such an 
inquiry should be the ‘recycled source/origin,’ or point at which the conflict 
mineral reentered the supply chain after being recycled, not the point at 
which the recycled conflict mineral was originally mined.” 120  This 
particular focus would reduce the burden on the companies who would 
otherwise struggle with discovering the origin points. Third was the 
argument that armed groups in the DRC are profiting from newly-mined 
minerals via taxation and control over the mines, and not from the reuse of 
the goods containing conflict minerals was another argument.121 
Not all lobbyists pushed to exclude minerals from scrap and recycled 
sources outright. Some lobbyists pushed to change the definitions of 
recycled and scrap minerals and sources.122 Other lobbyists suggested that 
                                                                                                                     
117 Id. at 56, 329–56, 330. 
118 Id. at 56, 330. 
119 Id. 
120 Comments of The National Mining Association at 15, to Securities Act Release No. 
34-63547, (Dec. 23, 2010), at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-393.pdf. 
121 Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 332. 
122 Id. at 56, 331. See also Comment of Karen Savala, President, Semiconductor 
Equipment and Materials International (SEMI) Americas, Release No. 34-63547; File No. 
S7-40-10 (Feb. 15, 2011) (stating: “if those minerals are reclaimed end-user or post-
consumer products but would not consider those minerals “recycled” if they are partially 
processed, unprocessed, or a byproduct from another ore.” Further stating: “a conflict 
mineral or a conflict mineral derivative that is within, or has been reclaimed from, a used 
628 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
companies not be subject to the Act if a majority of the minerals came from 
recycled or scrap sources.123 Many others presented different definitions for 
recycled and scrapped sources. 
After the proposals were made, a concrete definition of recycled and 
scrap materials was adopted pursuant to the Organization for Economic and 
Cooperation Development definition.124 For purposes of the Act, “conflict 
minerals are considered to be from recycled or scrap sources if they are 
from recycled metals, which are reclaimed end-user or post-consumer 
products, or scrap processed metals created during product 
manufacturing.” 125  Further, “recycled metal includes excess, obsolete, 
defective, and scrap metal materials that contain refined or processed metals 
that are appropriate to recycle in the production of tin, tantalum, tungsten 
and/or gold.”126  Lastly, “minerals partially processed, unprocessed, or a 
byproduct from another ore [are] not … included in the definition of 
recycled metal.”127 
The reporting measures for recycled and scrap metals are now such that if 
a manufacturer inquires and has reason to believe that the minerals may not 
be from recycled or scrap sources, then “it must exercise due diligence.”128 
If a manufacturer is unable to determine whether the minerals are from a 
recycled or scrap source, then a Conflict Minerals Report is required.129 But 
                                                                                                                     
product that was collected directly from the last product end user, or that was collected 
from a municipal waste stream.”). 
123 Comment of Srinivasan Venkatakrishnan, CFO, AngloGold Ashanti Limited, 
Johannesburg, South Africa, Release No 34-063547; File No. S7-40-10 (Jan. 31, 2011). 
124 Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 332. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 The legislators specifically stated that if a “due diligence framework becomes 
available… issuers will be required to utilize that framework.” Id. at 56, 282. Therefore, 
while companies are expected to follow the due diligence procedures for gold, it is 
unclear what due diligence procedures shall be followed for the other three minerals. Id. 
at 56, 333. 
129 Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 333. 
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if manufacturers do believe that they have used recycled or scrap minerals, 
they are not required to submit a Conflict Minerals Report and instead must 
“disclose how they have determined that sources are genuine scrap 
recycled.”130 The intent of such a disclosure is to avoid “laundering” new 
minerals to label them as recycled.131 
It is unclear what oversight will be provided to ensure that companies 
accurately disclose their sources. Given that there are enormous costs 
associated with this legislation, there is an incentive to misrepresent new 
minerals as scrap and recycled.132 If little or no oversight is provided, then 
new minerals could intentionally be excluded from reporting.133 Therefore, 
it is unclear if the intent behind the disclosure—to stop laundering—will be 
effective. 
The potential for unintentional wrongful disclosures is also a concern. 
American companies could potentially purchase minerals from other parts 
of the world, such as China or India, believing them to be scrap or recycled. 
Companies who purchase these minerals from “recyclers” will likely be 
unable to tell if they are recycled or scrap or have just been made to appear 
as such. These minerals could in turn be reported as “conflict free.” 
                                                                                                                     
130 Comments of Robert Walker, Vice President, ESG Services, NEI Investments, 
Vancouver, Canada at 20, to Securities Act Release No. 34-63547 (Dec. 23, 2010), at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-128.pdf. 
131 Id. at 2. 
132 Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 334. “[I]t is likely that the initial cost of 
compliance is approximately $3 billion to $4 billion, while the annual cost of ongoing 
compliance will be between $207 million and $609 million.” Id.  
133 Although companies are subject to auditing, if the risk of being “caught” is low and 
the cost of accurately reporting high, companies may untruthfully report. This risk is true 
throughout the Act and is a byproduct of the self-reporting scheme. 
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C. The “Necessary to the Functionality” Requirement is not Clearly 
Defined and Allows Companies to Determine Whether Their Products are 
Subject to the Act 
Companies are required to subject themselves to the rules of the Act if 
the conflict minerals are “necessary to the functionality or production of the 
product.”134 Upon review and during the comments period, many questions 
were raised regarding what constituted “necessary.” In the final version of 
the Act, there is no definition. 135  Instead, “guidance regarding the 
interpretation of these phrases” is given. 136  Regarding the functionality 
requirement, the legislation states what a company should consider: 
(a) Whether a conflict mineral is contained in and intentionally 
added to the product or any component of the product and is not a 
naturally-occurring by-product; (b) whether a conflict mineral is 
necessary to the product’s generally expected function, use, or 
purpose; or (c) if a conflict mineral is incorporated for purposes of 
ornamentation, decoration or embellishment, whether the primary 
purpose of the product is ornamentation or decoration.137 
If a product fits under one or more of these categories, then the company is 
required to follow the reporting process.138 The text of these parameters was 
intentionally left broad so as to allow companies to determine whether they 
are within the scope of the legislation.139 
The concern with the flexible language is that companies may incorrectly 
find that the minerals are not necessary to the functionality of their products. 
Whether done intentionally or unintentionally, the misclassifying of the 
product as not containing minerals “necessary to the functionality” reduces 
any potential positive impact the legislation may have. 
                                                                                                                     
134 Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 293. 
135 Id. at 56, 295. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
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D. The Exclusion of Conflict Minerals Used for Production of Goods 
Reduces the Effectiveness of the Act 
Initial drafts of the legislation required that companies be subject to the 
legislation if the conflict minerals were “necessary to the … production.”140 
This would have included companies using machinery or products 
containing conflict minerals in the manufacturing of products. The language 
was changed in the final bill, which now states that “the conflict mineral 
must be contained in the product” to subject it to the reporting 
requirements.141 
As it stands, a manufacturer should consider “whether a conflict mineral 
is contained in the product and intentionally added in the product’s 
production process.” 142  This includes “the production process of any 
component of the product; and whether the conflict mineral is necessary to 
produce the product.”143 
Many groups argued that the requirement of reporting goods made with 
the help of conflict minerals, but which did not actually contain them, 
would have substantially broadened the legislation.144 They further argued 
that the burden placed on companies to discover which equipment 
contained conflict minerals would have been extensive. The Association 
Connecting Electronic Industries made all of these arguments during the 
review process.145 In addition, the company noted that reporting on the 
production “may be unnecessarily duplicative, as any issuer manufacturing 
tools or machinery would be required to comply with the proposal if 
                                                                                                                     
140 Id. at 56, 296. 
141 Id. at 56, 297. 
142 Id. at 56, 295. 
143 Id. 
144 See id. at 56, 297. 
145 FERN ABRAMS, IPC- ASS’N CONNECTING ELECTRONIC INDUS. COMMENTS ON SEC 
PROPOSED RULE ON CONFLICT MINERALS, 1 (Mar. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010.shtml. 
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conflict minerals are necessary for the functionality of the tool or 
machine.”146 
While the exclusion of production products not containing conflict 
minerals themselves simplifies the legislation and reduces double counting, 
it weakens the effect of the legislation. If companies that use conflict 
minerals in their tools and equipment purchase the tools from companies 
that are not required to report, such as foreign companies, then the conflict 
minerals within the equipment are never subject to the Act. Arguably, 
including goods used in production would have broadened the legislation 
and been outside of the original scope, but it would have better helped 
achieve the legislature’s objective. 
E. The Exclusion of Generic Goods Allows Companies to Escape Reporting 
Requirements 
Initially, the Act stated that an “issuer that does not manufacture a 
product itself but that has ‘any’ influence over the product’s manufacturing” 
would be “considered to be contracting to manufacture that product,” and 
therefore made to follow the reporting procedures.147 During the comments 
period, many concerns were raised regarding companies who sell generic 
goods produced by other companies but sold under the store’s labels.148 
Those in favor of excluding companies selling generics, including Target, 
Lowe’s, J.C. Penney, Costco, and Wal-Mart, were able to weaken the 
legislation and relieve themselves of such responsibility.149 
As it stands, companies limiting themselves to the following are absolved 
from reporting: 
                                                                                                                     
146 Id. at 6. 
147 Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 291. 
148 Id. 56, 290. 
149 Jessica Hozer, Wal-Mart, Target Avoid Mineral Rules, WALL STREET JOURNAL 
ONLINE (Aug. 22, 2012, 8:26 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444 
082904577605630361858586.html  (noting some of the generic goods which contain 
conflict minerals include tin cans of food, light bulbs, and clothing items, including 
shoes). 
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(a) Specifying or negotiating contractual terms with a manufacturer 
that do not directly relate to the manufacturing of the product, such 
as training or technical support, price, insurance, indemnity, 
intellectual property rights, dispute resolution, or other like terms 
or conditions concerning the product, unless the issuer specifies or 
negotiates taking these actions so as to exercise a degree of 
influence over the manufacturing of the product that is practically 
equivalent to contracting on terms that directly relate to the 
manufacturing of the product; or 
(b) Affixing its brand, marks, logo, or label to a generic product 
manufactured by a third party; or 
(c) Servicing, maintaining, or repairing a product manufactured by 
a third party. 150 
It is unclear what “exercising a degree of influence” includes. The original 
proposed language included “any influence.”151 This was determined to be 
too broad, while the commentator’s proposal for “substantial influence” was 
deemed to be too narrow.152  But the lack of clear parameters for “any 
influence” is apt to cause problems and errors in reporting because, just like 
other language within the Act, it allows companies to mistakenly or 
intentionally misclassify their products. 
Beyond unclear language is another potential loophole: non-reporting 
companies (those outside of the United States) can supply generic goods to 
retailers. In turn, retailers will be able to sell the “American” goods while 
avoiding legislation and associated costs. Not only does this potential 
loophole encourage overseas production, but it also decreases the potential 
effect of legislation. 
                                                                                                                     
150 Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 291. 
151 Id. at 56, 291. 
152 Hozer, supra note 149. 
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VII. BROADER ISSUES WITH THE DESIGN OF THE ACT 
 Beyond specific concerns regarding definitions, inclusions, exclusions, 
and loopholes, many broader concerns are raised regarding the implications 
of the Act. Among others, these concerns include the issue of self-reporting, 
the delay in implementing the Act, the costs in implementing the Act, and 
how it will impact the American economy. This section discusses these 
concerns and whether they are legitimate or unwarranted. First though, it is 
necessary to consider the Kimberley Process when analyzing the Act and its 
potential implications. 
The Kimberley Process, the international response to the illegal diamond 
trade, requires that governments certify their diamonds as conflict free 
before exporting them to be processed.153 Each exporting and importing 
country that is participating in the process must follow set guidelines.154 The 
program has been met with mixed success, with supporters erroneously 
arguing that it ended wars in Sierra Leone and Angola.155 
While the process has not ended wars or the illegal diamond trade, it has 
had some success in holding countries accountable for their imports and 
exports and making consumers aware that diamonds fuel conflicts.156 These 
successes support some prospect of similar legislation dealing with conflict 
minerals having an impact, but still not solving the root problems fueling 
the crisis. However, it is important to remember when comparing the Act 
with the Kimberley Process that 75 countries currently participate in the 
Process.157 The Act will have just one. Therefore, if limited success has 
                                                                                                                     
153 The Kimberley Process, GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/ 
conflict/conflict-diamonds/kimberley-process  (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). Much of the 
Dodd-Frank 1502 was created with Kimberly in mind, with many members who created 
the Process aiding in Franks creation. Seay, supra note 7, at 22-23. 
154 The Kimberley Process, supra note 153. 
155 See Seay, supra note 7, at 22–23 (detailing the nature of the wars in these areas). 
156 Seay, supra note 7, at 22–23. 
157 The Kimberley Process, supra note 153. 
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been met with a global program, a much smaller success can be expected 
from the Act. 
A. Self-Reporting Will Inevitably Lead to Inconsistent Reporting and 
Companies Intentionally Excluding Products Containing Conflict Minerals 
from the Reporting Process 
A common theme throughout this paper is the issue of self-reporting. As 
explained previously, the legislation requires that the company, and not an 
outside regulator, report whether the products fall within the scope of the 
legislation. Undoubtedly this process creates less work in terms of 
government oversight because the company, and not a government-hired 
analyst, can determine if the product falls within the scope of the legislation. 
But self-reporting may raise the risk that companies will dishonestly 
classify their products as outside the scope of the Act.158 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the agency responsible 
for implementing and monitoring the reporting, has explained that it will 
impose standard penalties for non-compliance “such as fines and other SEC 
enforcement actions to which firms that violate SEC regulations may be 
subject.”159 But to actually detour companies from untruthfully classifying 
their products, the potential consequences (such as liability or fees) must 
outweigh the risk. Simply put, if no one is penalized for misrepresentation, 
or if the fees are too low compared to the costs of adhering to the legislation, 
then companies may be motivated to wrongly classify their products. A 
standardized approach used by a trained outside source would be costly, but 
it would reduce the chance of abuse and create a more consistent system. 
                                                                                                                     
158 The incentive to find products to be outside of the scope of the legislation comes as 
financial savings, and also a savings of company time in tracing the minerals and 
reporting to the SEC.  
159 NICHOLAS COOK, CONFLICT MINERALS IN CENTRAL AFRICA: US AND 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 9 (July 20, 2012), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42618.pdf. 
636 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
B. The Delay in Implementation and Exclusion of Minerals Already within 
the Supply Chain Prior to the Specified Date Delays any Positive Impact of 
the Act and Allows for the Stockpiling of Minerals 
Due to lobbyists, the Act now allows a transition period for companies to 
implement the new system of regulation over time. For larger companies 
the period is two years and for smaller companies the period is four years.160 
During the transition period, companies may report their products as 
“conflict undeterminable” if, after conducting a country of origin inquiry, 
they are “unable to determine if their conflict minerals financed or benefited 
armed groups” in the relevant countries, or if 
[A]fter [the company’s] reasonable country of origin inquiry, … 
they had a reason to believe that their necessary conflict minerals 
may have originated in the Covered Countries and may not have 
come from recycled or scrap sources and the information they 
gathered as a result of their subsequently required exercise of due 
diligence failed to clarify the conflict minerals’ country of origin, 
whether the conflict minerals financed or benefited armed groups 
in those countries, or whether the conflict minerals came from 
recycled or scrap sources.161 
Many lobbyists argue that the transition period is necessary because it 
allows companies more time to develop their reporting and tracing system, 
therein allowing them to pursue a less costly approach than if the transition 
were immediate.162 But the transition period will undoubtedly delay any 
positive impact the Act does have. 
Of greater concern is the date that minerals within the supply chain are 
subject to the reporting requirement. The original draft of the Act did not 
address minerals within the supply chain, but the final version of the Act 
was changed to exclude minerals within the supply chain prior to January 
                                                                                                                     
160 Conflict Minerals. supra note 1, at 56, 309. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
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31, 2013.163 Although the delay was arguably logistically necessary, it has 
serious consequences. The largest is the issue of stockpiling conflict 
minerals. 
While tracing stockpiles would likely prove more difficult than tracing 
recently mined minerals, the change to the legislation allows companies to 
plan their extraction and exportation to reduce the burden imposed by the 
legislation. With the change, companies are motivated to extract as many 
minerals as possible and either smelt them or move them to a country not 
covered by the legislation, such as Kenya. This allowance for stockpiled 
minerals to escape reporting provides an incentive to pursue a “mad-dash” 
for the minerals. Such a scramble is apt to increase violence over the access 
to the minerals and to create increased environmental harm as more mines 
are excavated at a faster pace. 
                                                                                                                     
163 “The final rule considers conflict minerals to be “outside the supply chain” only in the 
following instances: After any columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, and wolframite minerals 
have been smelted; after gold has been fully refined; or after any conflict mineral, or its 
derivatives, that have not been smelted or fully refined are located outside of the Covered 
Countries.” Conflict Minerals. supra note 1, at 56, 280. Lobbying efforts included that of 
the National Mining Association, which, in attempts to weaken the legislation, argued, 
“[a]s previously noted by NMA, depending on the point in the supply chain, conducting 
due diligence on the source of existing stockpiles or inventories of conflict minerals 
could be challenging if not impossible. Therefore, the final rule should either exempt 
existing stockpiles from reporting requirements, or allow for extra flexibility in regard to 
this type of disclosure. Furthermore, any stockpiles of minerals that pre-date the effective 
date of the new rules should be completely exempt from reporting requirements. 
However, should a manufacturer or company contracting to manufacture a product wish 
to voluntarily include stockpiled minerals in their initial disclosure or Conflict Minerals 
Report, they should be permitted to do so.” ELIZABETH M. MURPHY, NATI’L MINING 
ASS’N, NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON THE SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S PROPOSED RULE IMPLEMENTING SECTION 1502 
(CONFLICT MINERALS) OF THE DODD FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT, 15 (Nov. 1, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-
10/s74010.shtml. 
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C. The SEC’s is not Suited to Implement and Monitor Legislation 
Concerning Issues in the DRC 
The SEC is charged with implementing and monitoring the Act.164 The 
SEC’s mission is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient 
markets, and facilitate capital formation.”165 While the monitoring of US 
companies is within the sphere of the SEC’s mission, arguably the 
monitoring of an international humanitarian crisis is not. 166  Jeffrey W. 
Rubin, leader of the American Bar Association’s securities regulation 
committee, recently stated, “The SEC has three principal statutory 
mandates: investor protection, capital formation and fair and efficient 
markets,” and “[n]one of these are mentioned in 1502 of Dodd-Frank.”167 
The fear is that broadening the scope of the SEC’s duties will engage the 
agency in international humanitarian issues. Such a role not only increases 
the burden on the SEC, but also presents a risk that the steps taken by the 
SEC may not be in the best interest of the DRC. This is because the SEC 
was created for and is focused on US security, and the SEC employees do 
not understand the full extent of the crisis or the impact the legislation will 
have on the DRC.168 
Those in favor of SEC control argue that the SEC has authority over the 
corporations that are involved; therefore, the legislation is not 
overreaching.169 This argument is sound—the SEC does have control over 
the corporations impacted by the Act. But the argument fails to address the 
                                                                                                                     
164The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, 
and Facilitates Capital Formation, US SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2013). 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Jesse Hamilton, SEC Battles African Warlords Under Dodd-Frank, BLOOMBERG 
(Jun. 22, 2011, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-23/sec-battles-
african-warlords-under-dodd-frank.html. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. Adam M. Kanzer, managing director and general counsel for New York-based 
Domini Social Investments LLC, acknowledged that, “We’re in a globalized economy 
where you can’t ignore things anymore.” Id. 
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concern that a national agency focused on US companies and the economy 
is now in a position to influence complex international humanitarian issues. 
D. The Act gives International Companies an Economic Advantage 
One outcome of the Act is that it gives foreign companies an economic 
advantage. Once the Act is implemented, US companies will either seek the 
minerals from other regions or pay the costs incurred when adhering to the 
reporting requirements. 
If US companies purchase minerals elsewhere, the Act will fail to 
achieve the legislative intent of curbing the crisis in the DRC. While US 
companies buy elsewhere, foreign companies will take over the demand for 
their portion of the minerals. Not only does this fail to positively impact the 
situation in the DRC, but it also has the potential to negatively impact it 
because the worst offenders in the exportation of conflict minerals, all 
Asian companies, will likely buy a portion of the minerals previously 
purchased by US companies.170 
If US companies continue to use minerals subject to the Act, they will be 
forced to bear the costs incurred to adhere to the Act while foreign 
companies will not. While no concrete figures exist, various estimates show 
that the costs will be substantial. The SEC’s analysis found that “after 
analyzing the comments and taking into account additional data and 
information, [they] believe it is likely that the initial cost of compliance is 
approximately $3 billion to $4 billion, while the annual cost of ongoing 
compliance will be between $207 million and $609 million.” 171  Those 
within the affected industries insist that this estimate falls short of actual 
costs. For example, IPC, Association Connecting Electronics Industries (a 
                                                                                                                     
170 For a rating of company diligence on avoiding conflict minerals, see Conflict Minerals 
Company Ranking, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO, http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/ 
conflict-minerals-company-rankings (last visited Feb. 27, 2013). At the bottom of the list 
are companies such as Nintendo, HTC, Sharp, Nikon, and Canon. These companies are 
not listed in the US, and therefore are not required to adhere to the legislation. 
171 Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 335. 
640 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
trade association in the electronics industry), calculated “median due 
diligence burdens in excess of $65,000 (USD) per company in the first 
year.”172 IPC then added $170,000 for the “estimated costs for tracking 
software, additional staff, training, legal expenses, and third party audits.”173 
But it also estimated that for “printed circuit board (PCB) and electronic 
manufacturing services (EMS) companies along with their suppliers, the 
estimated cost impact of due diligence is estimated at roughly 279 million 
dollars in the first year alone, with ongoing annual costs expected to be 
around 165 million dollars.”174 The National Association of Manufacturers 
also estimated the implementation costs for US industry, “asserting that it 
will more likely be between $9-16 billion.”175 
Part of the difficulty in estimating the likely cost is the unknown number 
of companies which will fall under the scope of the legislation. Competitive 
Enterprise Industries, a non-profit public policy organization that 
specializes in regulatory issues, commented to the SEC that 
While the Commission estimates the rules will apply to 
approximately 6,000 companies, the actual number of companies 
subjected to their repercussions is likely much higher. Lawrence 
Heim of Elm Consulting Group International estimates at least 
12,000 companies will be affected by the rules, reasoning that 
                                                                                                                     
172 FERN ABRAMS, IPC- ASS’N CONNECTING ELECTRONIC INDUS. COMMENTS ON SEC 
PROPOSED RULE ON CONFLICT MINERALS, 1 (Mar. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010.shtml. 
173 Id. at 3–4. 
174 Id. at 2. The costs originate in the form of additional scrutiny required of a company’s 
supply chains, as well as the expenses of compiling a Conflict Minerals Report in the 
event a company cannot verify the absence of conflict minerals in its products. These 
reports require companies to detail their due diligence efforts with regard to their supply 
chains, and must be vetted by an independent private-sector auditor. The burden on 
businesses will be significant. 
JOHN BERLAU, ALEX NOWRASTEH & LUKE PELICAN, CTR. FOR INVESTORS AND 
ENTREPRENEURS,  SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS OF THE COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE 
INSTITUTE, 1 (Aug. 22, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-
10/s74010.shtml. 
175 Id. 
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many suppliers may not be directly subject to the rules but 
nevertheless affected by the compliance efforts of issuers.176 
But even without accurate figures, the fact remains that many companies 
will be impacted at a substantial cost. Although there is no free solution to 
attaining peace in the DRC, the high price to be paid by US companies 
could not come at a worse time with the financial crisis. The costs of 
abiding by the Act is only made more frustrating when one considers that 
the humanitarian impact is likely to be minimal at best. 
E. The Act Results in Unintended Mining Bans which Harm Civilians 
The mining ban implemented by Kabila in 2010 left thousands of 
Congolese involved in the mineral trade out of work, the repercussions of 
which were felt by their families and their communities. However, Kabila 
was not the only one to implement a ban as a result of the Act. Shortly after 
the ban was lifted in March 2011 and Dodd-Frank was about to be 
implemented, the Malaysia Smelting Company stopped accepting DRC 
minerals after being put under pressure from a watchdog group, the 
Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition. 177  Having bought up to 80 
percent of its tin from the DRC, the MSC’s embargo was devastating to the 
DRC civilians.178 
The responses from Kabila and MSC emphasize the need for the US to 
have a global understanding of the complex problem surrounding the 
situation in the DRC. The legislation is not simply a US response that will 
only affect US corporations—it affects the Congolese civilians, 
international companies, and many countries connected to the DRC. Given 
                                                                                                                     
176 Id. at 4–5. 
177 Seay, supra note 7, at 14. “The EICC created a tracing scheme for smelters that 
requires corporations to show their ores to be conflict free, and most companies were to 
work through a tin industry group called ITRI to ensure their minerals were appropriately 
tagged as being conflict-free. This tracing scheme went into effect on April 1, 2011. 
However, MSC could not guarantee that all of its minerals would be ITRI-tagged and so 
stopped purchasing minerals from D.R. Congo.” Id. 
178 Id. 
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the response from Kabila and MSC, it appears that the US either did not 
understand the likelihood of bans resulting from the Act or did not fully 
comprehend how the bans would impact the DRC. The consequences of this 
lack of foresight have been substantial. 
VIII. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
The Act has shown that the United States recognizes that it is not a 
singular cell, but part of a large web where its actions impact remote areas 
of the world. What the lawmakers failed to acknowledge, or did not care 
enough to explore, is how complex that web is or how the Act will impact, 
and has impacted, others. 
The Act has oversimplified the situation in the DRC, with the proponents 
believing that the requirements of the Act will reduce the illegitimate 
mineral trade and thus reduce or extinguish the violence in the DRC. But as 
has been shown throughout this article, the Act is unlikely to positively 
affect the DRC. The ban will not stop the mineral trade—any US companies 
that go elsewhere to purchase their minerals will simply be replaced with 
foreign companies. Nor will the ban reduce the violence or address the 
militias and rebels that control the region. Instead of focusing on the causes 
of the violence, including land rights, lack of government, lack of economic 
opportunity, and ethnic tension, the Act simplifies the crisis to be based 
only on minerals. And as the Act fails to better the situation in the DRC, US 
companies will struggle to adhere to complex and expensive reporting 
requirements. 
While this article has discussed a wide variety of considerations 
connected to the Act and teased out the individual aspects of the legislation 
that make it weak or ineffective, the general goal of this piece is to provide 
law makers and the aid industry with an understanding of how legislation 
aimed at bettering a situation can have negative and unintentional impacts. 
Based on the complex situation in the DRC, I would argue that no US 
legislation would effectively end, or even substantially curb, the violence in 
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the region. The problem must be addressed in the DRC, with companies and 
countries involved in the region either through trade or politics. But even if 
the general idea behind the Act of US companies self-reporting would have 
been effective, the final version would have failed to accomplish its goals 
because the lobbyists’ efforts resulted in countless loopholes and weakening 
of the original legislation. 
This raises the question of what will work to stop the violence and end 
the crisis. Although there is not one clear answer, those who thoroughly 
understand the crisis and the implications of the proposed solutions of the 
Act have a multitude of ideas. 
A. Invest in Tracing the Mineral Process 
Money should be invested to learn how the mineral trade works in its 
entirety. As previously discussed, the minerals change hands many times 
before leaving the DRC. Practically no records are kept, and it is nearly 
impossible for the exporter to know where the minerals have come from or 
who has handled them along the way because of the complex dynamic 
between the government, rebels, and miners. 
Lawmakers cannot fully and accurately understand the impact that any 
legislation will have without a full understanding of the process. A tracking 
method should be put in place to trace the routes that the minerals take. Two 
options include tracking specific minerals or employing researchers along 
the routes to record the minerals. While either option would face logistical 
difficulties, including opposition by those illegally trading, it is necessary to 
aid in a better understanding of the trade and create a more comprehensive 
and impactful solution to the crisis. 
B. Gain Better Insight into the Rebels 
It is difficult to understand the rebel groups’ goals and motivations for 
resorting to violence. While much of the violence is over land, minerals, 
and power, there are other considerations that need to be explored. 
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Villainizing the rebels and engaging in warfare is one option. But another is 
to initiate dialogue in order to understand what they aim to achieve via their 
violent means. An open and safe forum without risk of prosecution would 
enable the rebels to express their demands. This would better allow the 
DRC government and other aid industries and nations to understand the 
motivation behind the violence and address the root problems.179 
C. Confront Neighboring Countries 
As discussed, the mineral trade involves neighboring countries to the 
DRC. Because the governments of these countries finance the violence and 
reap the monetary rewards of the trade, they must be considered in 
developing a peace plan. While the initial goal would be to hold the 
countries accountable for providing support, care must be taken not to 
alienate the countries and push them to use  military or violent means to 
maintain their income. A possible solution would be to provide the 
governments with some profits from the DRC so that they are not enticed to 
support the militia. While still “exploitation,” the incentive would be a 
short-term solution that could aid the peace efforts in the DRC. 
D. Address Land and Ethnic Disputes 
Given that much of the violence is conflict over land and ethnicity, 
efforts must be made to solve the underlying disputes. A recent New York 
Times article emphasized the impact of not addressing the ongoing land and 
                                                                                                                     
179 Séverine Autesserre, The Only Way to Help Congo, N.Y. TIMES, June. 22, 
2012,http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/the-only-way-to-help 
congo.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1382596727V%20oFWcHI23HS
mZJacuzRhw&. The importance of understanding the rebels’ thought process in creating 
a sustainable solution is emphasized by recent international events. Id. Over the past few 
years attention has been focused on the rates of rape and other sexual violence in the 
DRC. Id. As a result of the attention, the rebels have begun using such violence and 
attention as a pawn in their schemes. Id. This correlation between rebel action and 
international attention emphasizes the need to consider the implications of any further 
actions worldwide, even news reporting. Id. 
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ethnic disputes, stating “[i]f the international community continues to 
address the consequences of the violence in Congo rather than its most 
important causes, it will only add to the death toll.”180 Land and ethnic 
disputes are complex issues with no simple solution and will therefore not 
be discussed in depth here. But whatever peace initiatives are explored, the 
land and ethnic disputes must be considered fundamental to the solution.181 
E. Support Infrastructure and Education 
Infrastructure, including roads, water lines, electricity, 
telecommunications, and educational programs have been long-term goals 
of many aid organizations and should continue to be. Unlike short-term 
forms of aid such as food and medicine, the development of infrastructure 
and places of education create the foundation for long-term stability. 
Education is extremely important in reducing poverty because it not only 
provides people with knowledge, but it also results in increased income and 
better health, which in turn fuels the economy. 182  One form of higher 
education that would directly impact the mineral trade and the local 
economy would be a program that teaches Congolese how to process the 
minerals. While normally done in Asia, the processing of the minerals in the 
DRC would keep more money in the local economy. 
Similar to education, infrastructure reduces poverty. 183 Roads, 
telecommunication networks, hospitals, drains, and other forms of 
                                                                                                                     
180 Id. 
181 While there is much that could be said about the process and prospect of solving land 
disputes, for purposes of this article, I raise it as one of many considerations that must be 
explored to stop the violence. 
182 See The Value of Education, Global Partnership for Education, 
http://www.globalpartnership.org/who-we-are/the-value-of-education/ (last visited Nov. 4, 
2013). Wangari Matthai, a Kenyan-born Nobel Peace Prize winner, wrote about the lack 
of education in Africa. Comparing Africa to Asia, Matthai explained that Asia has been 
successful because “while too many African nations invested in ‘security,’” Asia invested 
in education, specifically making “education in science and technology a national 
priority.” WANGARI MAATHAI, THE CHALLENGE FOR AFRICA 102 (2009). 
183 See Infrastructure and Poverty, GLOBAL POVERTY PROJECT, http://www.globalpove 
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infrastructure “facilitate[] the basic functions of a society that are necessary 
to transport resources and people, produce and trade goods, provide 
essential services and ultimately reduce poverty.”184 With infrastructure in 
place, people are less focused on their basic needs for survival and are better 
able to contribute economically to society.185 
The biggest problem faced when trying to create infrastructure and 
education in the DRC is the continued violence. No area of the conflict 
region is truly safe from rebels. This is evidenced by the fact that in 
December 2012, the city of Goma, which is the base to most aid agencies, 
was taken over by rebels.186 If Goma, with such a large aid presence, can be 
“captured,” one can expect that all other areas are at risk.  
IX. CONCLUSION 
With the complexity of the crisis there must be a united and 
comprehensive front. The short-term goal should be to form an international 
coalition of individuals who can explore the crisis in the DRC and then 
tease out the factors that must be considered in creating a sustainable 
solution. Such a coalition must include DRC government officials, miners, 
rebels, government officials of neighboring and benefitting countries, and 
aid agencies and corporations involved in the mineral trade. 
By including members of the DRC government, the coalition can ensure 
that the government understands and supports the planned solution. The 
government members can critically examine any proposals for how they can 
be implemented through political means. 
Other Congolese must also be present at the table. This includes artisanal 
miners and traders, as well as members of rebel groups. While they may not 
                                                                                                                     
rtyproject.com/infobank/infrastructure (last visited Oct. 11, 2013). 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Jeffery Gettleman, Congo Slips into Chaos Again as Rebels Gain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/world/africa/as-rebels-gain-congo-again-
slips-into-chaos.html?_r=0. 
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be elected officials or highly educated, these groups do have extensive 
knowledge of the crisis because they understand what happens on the 
ground and what the goals and consequences of each action are. These 
individuals will be able to realistically foresee how the peace process will 
be accepted and the potential implementation issues when discussing the 
proposals. 
Neighboring governments should also be allowed to contribute to the 
discussion. Countries such as Rwanda and Uganda have contributed to the 
violence and also gain substantial rewards from the DRC mineral trade. 
Therefore, they must be able to voice their interests and concerns to ensure 
that they support the peace efforts, instead of working against them. 
Other countries that reap the benefits of the crisis, specifically those in 
Asia, Europe, and North America, must also contribute. It is important to 
understand what peace initiatives these countries will support politically, 
monetarily, and perhaps physically. A united front is necessary to ensure 
that countries will not work against peace initiatives in efforts to obtain 
cheap minerals. 
Similar to foreign countries, the aid agencies need to have a voice. The 
UN and many other agencies have a large presence in the DRC and engage 
in many different initiatives. It is necessary to ensure that aid agencies are 
working in support of the legislation and not unintentionally against it. 
Lastly, corporations will need to be present. As this paper has discussed, 
corporations rely heavily on the DRC for their products’ contents. If 
corporations are not behind the efforts, they could potentially purchase 
minerals supporting the conflict and hinder the DRC peace initiative. 
Therefore, whatever policy implemented must have corporate support. 
Attaining peace and stability in the DRC is far from hopeless—the 
violence can be stopped. The Act reveals that the United States understands 
that it plays a role in the crisis, yet the Act falls short of actually addressing 
the root causes of the problem. A weak piece of legislation, full of 
loopholes and designed by those unfamiliar with the crisis, is likely to have 
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minimal (if any) success in stopping the violence. Moving forward, a 
coalition of knowledgeable individuals from around the world must work 
together to look at the actual causes of the violence and design a DRC-
based initiative that can settle the disputes that continue to claim the lives of 
thousands each month. 
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APPENDIX A: 
 
 
                        
                      Source: Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 283. 
